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Abstract
In this paper we study selected argument forms involving
counterfactuals and indicative conditionals under uncertainty.
We selected argument forms to explore whether people with
an Eastern cultural background reason differently about con-
ditionals compared to Westerners, because of the differences
in the location of negations. In a 2× 2 between-participants
design, 63 Japanese university students were allocated to four
groups, crossing indicative conditionals and counterfactuals,
and each presented in two random task orders. The data
show close agreement between the responses of Easterners and
Westerners. The modal responses provide strong support for
the hypothesis that conditional probability is the best predic-
tor for counterfactuals and indicative conditionals. Finally,
the grand majority of the responses are probabilistically coher-
ent, which endorses the psychological plausibility of choosing
coherence-based probability logic as a rationality framework
for psychological reasoning research.
Keywords: argument forms; cross-cultural comparison; coun-
terfactuals; indicative conditionals; negation; probability
logic; reasoning under uncertainty
Introduction
In this paper we study selected argument forms involving
counterfactuals and indicative conditionals under uncertainty.
The aim is to explore potential cross-cultural differences in
human reasoning about conditionals and negation under un-
certainty between Easterners and Westerners. So far, cross-
cultural differences in reasoning involving negations have
been described in the classical-logic based (old) paradigm
psychology of reasoning literature (see, e.g., Nisbett, Peng,
Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nis-
bett, 2002; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Yama, in press). These
previous studies demonstrate that Westerners are inclined to
engage in rule-based reasoning whereas Easterners are apt to
engage in intuitive or dialectical reasoning. In other words,
Easterners are more likely to consider contradictory premises
dialectically than Westerners. However, Zhang, Galbraith,
Yama, Wang, and Manktelow (2015) report that Easterners
are not actually more dialectical when they meet contradic-
tory opinions, but they believe due to cultural reasons that
dialectical thinking is wiser than Westerners. Because con-
tradictory premises are not used in this experiment, we do not
make predictions concerning whether Easterners reason more
dialectical or not (see, e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Rather,
we explore whether the location of negation in the context of
conditionals impacts on reasoning and whether our Japanese
sample differs from corresponding data of Western samples.
Moreover, if Japanese people see a stronger cultural value in
dialectical thinking, it is plausible to assume that they may
hesitate to show stronger confidence in the correctness of
their judgments. Our study presents one of the first attempts
(see also Yama, in press) to identify cross-cultural differences
within the framework of the new probability-based paradigm
psychology of reasoning.
Among the various ways of expressing and using counter-
factuals (see, e.g. Declerck & Reed, 2001), we restrict our
investigation of counterfactuals to conditionals in subjunctive
mood, where the grammatical structure implies that the coun-
terfactual’s antecedent (A) is factually false. For instance,
consider the utterance of the following counterfactual in the
context of a randomly drawn poker card:
If the drawn card were to show an ace (A),
then it would show spades (C) .
(1)
The grammatical structure of (1) pragmatically entails that
the drawn card is not an ace (¬A), i.e., the antecedent A of (1)
is false. By “indicative conditional” we mean an “if–then”
statement of the form If A, then C, e.g.,
If the drawn card shows an ace, then it shows spades . (2)
Contrary to the counterfactual (1), the indicative condi-
tional (2) does not imply whether the card actually shows an
ace or not. While the core meaning of indicative conditionals
was equated with the semantics of the material conditional
in the classical logic-based paradigm (or “old”) psychology
of reasoning (see, e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Rips, 1994; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972), our
work is located in the new paradigm psychology of reasoning,
where conditionals are interpreted as conditional probabil-
ity assertions (see, e.g., Elqayam, Bonnefon, & Over, 2016;
Oaksford& Chater, 2007; Over, 2009; Pfeifer, 2013). Instead
of using (fragments of) classical logic, the new paradigm psy-
chology of reasoning uses probability theory as a rationality
framework. Probability as a rationality framework is psy-
chologically and philosophically appealing for many reasons
(see, e.g., Pfeifer & Douven, 2014). Let us mention three of
them.
First, probability theory allows for managing degrees of be-
lief instead of restricting belief to the two values true and
false as in the case of bivalent classical logic. Thus, probabil-
ity theory provides a much richer framework to study condi-
tionals. It allows for analysing different psychological predic-
tions concerning conditionals: not only in terms of the mate-
rial conditional (A⊃C) and the conjunction (A∧C) as defined
in classical logic, but also in terms of the conditional event
(C|A), as defined in coherence-based probability logic (see,
e.g., Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; Gilio, Pfeifer, & Sanfilippo,
2016; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009). Table 1 presents the truth
conditions of these three interpretations. Note that the con-
ditional event cannot be expressed in classical bivalent logic.
We hypothesise that the degree of belief in a conditional If A,
then C is interpreted by a suitable conditional probability as-
sertion (p(C|A)) and neither as the probability of the material
conditional (p(A⊃C)) nor as the probability of the conjunc-
tion (p(A∧C)). We will test these three interpretations in the
following experiment.
Table 1: Truth tables for the material conditional A⊃C inter-
pretation, the conjunction∧ interpretation and the conditional
event interpretationC|A of a (counterfactual) conditional If A
(were the case), then C (would be the case).
A C A⊃C ∧ C|A
true true true true true
true false false false false
false true true false undetermined
false false true false undetermined
Second, probability logic blocks so-called paradoxes of the
material conditional (see, e.g., Pfeifer, 2014). For example,
¬A (“not-A”) logically entails A ⊃ C. It is easy to imagine
natural language instantiations for A and C, where this in-
ference appears counterintuitive. The paradox arises, when
the material conditional is used to formalize a natural lan-
guage conditional. In probability logic, the inference from
p(¬A) = x to p(C|A) is probabilistically non-informative, i.e.,
if p(¬A) = x, then 0 ≤ p(C|A) ≤ 1 is coherent; hence, the
paradox is blocked (Pfeifer, 2014). This also matches exper-
imental data based on samples involving Westerners (Pfeifer
& Kleiter, 2011; Pfeifer & Tulkki, in press). Note that the
paradox is not blocked if the conditional probability (conclu-
sion) is replaced by p(A ⊃ C) or by p(A∧C). A subgoal
of this paper is to explore how Japanese participants reason
about this paradox.
Third, probability allows for retracting conclusions in the
light of new evidence while classical logic is monotonic (i.e.,
adding a premise to a logically valid argument can only in-
crease the set of conclusions). The suppression effect (see,
e.g., Byrne, 1989; Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2005) illus-
trates peoples’ capacity to retract conclusions if new premises
are learned. Moreover, experimental data suggests that most
people satisfy basic nonmonotonic reasoning postulates of
System P (see, e.g. Benferhat, Bonnefon, & Da Silva Neves,
2005; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005, 2010). The rules of System P
describe formally basic principles any system of nonmono-
tonic reasoning should satisfy (Kraus, Lehmann, & Magi-
dor, 1990) and different semantics were developed, includ-
ing probabilistic ones. Probabilistic semantics postulate that
conditionals should be represented by conditional probabil-
ity assertions (see, e.g., Adams, 1975; Gilio, 2002). Inter-
estingly, inference rules which are (in)valid in System P are
also (in)valid in standard systems of counterfactual condition-
als (like Lewis, 1973). This convergence shows a close re-
lation between conditional probabilities and counterfactuals.
Compared to the big number of psychological investigations
on indicative conditionals (for overviews see, e.g., Evans &
Over, 2004; Nickerson, 2015), studies on adult reasoning
about counterfactuals are surprisingly rare (Over, Hadjichris-
tidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007; Pfeifer & Sto¨ckle-
Schobel, 2015; Pfeifer & Tulkki, in press). Our study sheds
new light by adding a cross-cultural perspective on indicative
conditionals and counterfactuals.
Table 2: Task names, their abbreviations and formal struc-
tures used in the experiment, where ¬ denotes negation, →
is a placeholder for denoting the indicative conditional or the
counterfactual,⊃ denotes the material conditional, ∴ denotes
“Therefore”.
Task name (abbreviation) Argument form
Aristotle’s thesis #1 (AT1) it’s not the case that:(¬A→ A)
Aristotle’s thesis #2 (AT2) it’s not the case that:(A→¬A)
Negated Reflexivity (NR) it’s not the case that:(A→ A)
From “Every” to “If” (EIn) Every S is P ∴ S→¬P
From “Every” to “If” (EI) Every S is P ∴ S→ P
Modus Ponens (MP) A, A→C ∴ C
Negated MP (NMP) A, A→C ∴ ¬C
Paradox (Prdx) ¬A ∴ A→C
Table 2 lists the task names, their abbreviations, and their
underlying logical form used in our experiment. All argument
forms were investigated previously in the literature on West-
ern samples. Each argument form is suitable for indicative
and subjunctive formulations. They are carefully selected to
distinguish between the material conditional, conjunction and
conditional event interpretation of conditionals. Tasks AT1,
AT2, and NR (adapted from Pfeifer, 2012) are about negating
conditionals. Note that there are two ways to negate mate-
rial conditionals, namely the wide scope negation of material
conditionals (i.e., A⊃C can be negated by ¬(A⊃C)) and the
narrow scope negation of material conditionals (i.e., A⊃C is
negated by negating its consequentC: A⊃ ¬C). Table 3 lists
the normative predictions of the different argument forms.
Averaging the percentages of responses in three studies re-
veals that 73% of the participants in task AT1, 75% in task
AT2, and 80% of the participants in task NR responded prob-
abilistically coherently according to the conditional probabil-
ity interpretation (Pfeifer, 2012; Pfeifer & Sto¨ckle-Schobel,
2015; Pfeifer & Tulkki, in press).
Task EI (resp., task EIn) connects the basic syllogistic sen-
tence type “Every S is P” with associated conditionals (resp.,
conditionals involving negations) in the indicative and in the
counterfactual form. The motivation for these tasks is to shed
light on the hypothesised close relations between quantified
statements and conditional probability assertions in the liter-
ature (see, e.g. Cohen, 2012; Pfeifer & Sanfilippo, 2017, sub-
mitted). Recent data of Westerners suggest, that in task ASP
73% of the participants respond that the conclusion holds,
whereas 88% of the participants respond that the conclusion
in task ASnP does not hold (Pfeifer & Tulkki, in press), which
corresponds to the normative predictions.
We also investigate the well-known MP and its not logi-
cally valid but probabilistically informative counterpart NMP.
In a sample of Western participants (Pfeifer & Tulkki,
in press), 68% responded correctly, that the conclusion in task
MP holds, and 63% responded correctly that the conclusion
in task NMP does not hold (see also Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2007).
Finally, as mentioned above, we investigate one of the
paradoxes of the material conditional. Western data on
Task Prdx indicates that most people (87% on the aver-
age) understand that this argument form is probabilistically
non-informative (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2011; Pfeifer & Tulkki,
in press).
Method
Materials and Design
We used a 2 × 2 between-participants design where we
crossed task formulations in terms of indicative conditionals
versus formulations in terms of counterfactuals. To control
for position effects, we used two random orders (generated
by random.org). This resulted in four different task book-
lets.
Each booklet consisted of a brief introduction, of eight
tasks, and of questions about the booklets (task difficulty,
whether participants took logic or probability classes and
whether they like maths). Furthermore, we included usual de-
mographic questions at the end. The logical forms of the eight
tasks are explained in Table 2. We instantiated these logical
forms into a cover story which was already used in studies on
Western samples (see, e.g., Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2011; Pfeifer &
Tulkki, in press). We adapted and translated this cover story
for the Japanese sample.
For each task, the participants were asked to imagine the
following situation:
Hanako works in a factory that produces toy blocks. She
is responsible for controlling the production. Every toy
block has a shape (cylinder, cube or pyramid) and a
colour (red, blue or green). For example:
• Red cylinder, red cube, red pyramid
• Blue cylinder, blue cube, . . .
• Green cylinder, . . .
Then, for example in task AT1 (indicative conditional), the
participants were asked to consider the following sentence:
It is not the case, that: If the toy block is not a cube,
then the toy block is a cube.
The instructions continued by the following questions, which
prompt answers in a forced choice format:
Can Hanako infer at all how sure she can be that the
sentence in the box holds? (please tick the appropriate
box)
 NO, Hanako can not infer how sure she can be that
the sentence in the box holds.
 YES, Hanako can infer how sure she can be that the
sentence in the box holds.
If you chose “YES”, please tick one of the following
answers:
 Hanako can be sure that the sentence in the box
holds.
 Hanako can be sure that the sentence in the box
does not hold.
After each target task, the participants were instructed to rate
on a scale their subjective confidence in their response. The
correspondingAT1 task involving counterfactualswas formu-
lated in exactly the same way with the difference, that the
indicative conditional was replaced by a corresponding coun-
terfactual, as follows:
It is not the case, that: If the toy block were not a
cube, then the toy block would be a cube.
For those tasks involving explicit premises (i.e., in tasks EIn,
EI, MP, NMP, and Prdx), we formulated uncertainties in terms
of verbal descriptions (“quite sure”). For instance, consider
task MP:
(A) . . .quite sure that the toy block is a cube.
(B) . . .quite sure that if the toy block is a cube, then it is
red.
Participants and procedure
63 Osaka City University undergraduate students participated
in this study (mean age 20.02 (SD= 1.05) years, 34 females,
21 males, 8 did not disclose their gender). Their major sub-
jects included various humanistic fields (3 commerce, 5 cul-
ture, 1 geography, 5 history, 4 Japanese, 8 law, 5 linguistics, 1
pedagogy, 2 philosophy, 17 psychology, 2 sociology, and 10
other). Nobody had ever taken logic classes but two partici-
pants had previously taken some probability classes. At the
end of the experiment, participants evaluated the set of tasks
as rather difficult (mean 2.76 (SD = 2.11) on a scale rang-
ing from 0 (“very difficult”) to 10 (“very easy”)). 82.54%
reported that they do not like maths.
All participants were tested at the same time during a les-
son in a course on cultural psychology. For reducing the
probability for copy-pasting responses, the booklets were dis-
tributed such that the two task orders and the two formula-
tions of the conditionals (indicative vs. counterfactual) alter-
nated systematically. Moreover, the experimenter announced
that the task booklets differ before the participants started
with filling in their responses. The booklets were formulated
in Japanese, the participants’ mother tongue.
Results and discussion
We performed Fisher’s exact tests to compare the response
frequencies among the four booklets (task order 1 × task or-
der 2× indicative conditionals× counterfactuals) and did not
observe any significant differences after performing Holm-
Bonferroni corrections for multiple significance tests. Like-
wise, analyses of variance on the participant’s confidence
ratings in the correctness of their responses did not show
statistically significant differences among the four booklets.
This replicates previous findings in studies which used West-
ern samples. Specifically, studies on probabilistic truth table
tasks (Over et al., 2007; Pfeifer & Sto¨ckle-Schobel, 2015) and
on uncertain argument forms (Pfeifer & Tulkki, in press) did
not detect significant difference between indicative condition-
als and counterfactuals. Thus, our data speak against cross-
cultural differences between Easterners and Westerners. This
calls for further experiments to clarify whether this interest-
ing negative result is due to a too high dissimilarity of our
tasks compared to those in other studies on cross-cultural dif-
ferences. Or, alternatively, whether cross-cultural differences
are not that strong as they are claimed to be (see, e.g., Zhang
et al., 2015).
Since there were no significant differences in the responses
among the four booklets, we pooled the data for the follow-
ing data analysis (N = 63). Concerning the interpretation of
conditionals, we observed high endorsement rates of the con-
ditional probability hypothesis (see Table 3). This is strong
support for the hypothesis that both indicative conditionals
and counterfactuals are best modeled by conditional proba-
bility.
Table 3: Percentages (n = 63) of “holds” (hld), “does
not hold” (¬hld), and probabilistic non-informativeness re-
sponses (n-inf; see also Table 2). Predictions based on
the conditional probability hypothesis of conditionals are in
bold. Alternative hypotheses are indicated in parentheses:
¬⊃ (resp., ⊃¬) denotes wide (resp., narrow) scope negation
of the material conditional ⊃; ∧ denotes conjunction. If not
specified otherwise, predictions coincide.
AT1 AT2 NR EIn
hld: 65.08
(⊃¬
∧
)
76.19
(⊃¬
∧
)
6.35 6.45
¬hld: 15.87 11.11 63.49(¬⊃) 69.35
n-i: 19.05(¬⊃) 12.70(¬⊃) 30.16
(⊃¬
∧
)
24.20
EI MP NMP Prdx
hld: 88.89 53.97 9.52 0.00(⊃)
¬hld: 6.35 3.17 52.38 17.46(∧)
n-inf: 4.76 42.86 38.10 82.54
Table 4 presents the mean confidence ratings, which shows
how sure the participants are that their responses are correct.
The confidences are relatively high, with an average value of
7.2 on a rating scale from 0 to 10.
Table 4: Mean (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the par-
ticipants’ confidence ratings (n= 63) on a scale from 0 (“very
sure that my response is not correct”) to 10 (“very sure that
my response is correct”; see also Table 2).
AT1 AT2 NR EIn EI MP NMP Prdx
M 6.77 6.86 7.20 7.71 8.02 7.18 7.02 6.82
SD 1.99 2.06 2.37 1.99 1.97 2.10 2.08 1.93
Concluding remarks
Our data suggest that people form their degree of belief in
the counterfactual If A were the case, C would be the case by
equating it with the corresponding conditional probability of
C|A. This is consistent with the observation in previous ex-
perimental work (with Western participants) that people treat
the factual statement as irrelevant when they form their de-
gree of belief in a counterfactual (Pfeifer & Sto¨ckle-Schobel,
2015; Pfeifer & Tulkki, in press). This can be justified and
explained by the coherence-based theory of nested condition-
als (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013, 2014; Gilio, Over, Pfeifer, &
Sanfilippo, 2017, submitted). Given three events A,B,C with
incompatible A and B (i.e., A∧B is a logical contradiction)
the prevision of the conditional random quantity ((C|B)|A)
is equal to p(C|B) (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013, Example 1, p.
225). Thus, the counterfactual If A were the case, C would be
the case can be modeled by the degree of belief in the con-
ditional random quantity (C|A)|¬A which equals to p(C|A)
(i.e., Prevision((C|A)|¬A) = p(C|A)). This is an explanation
for why people—as experimentally demonstrated in Western
samples and also in our Japanese sample—respond by corre-
sponding conditional probabilities when asked to give a de-
gree of belief in a counterfactual.
Our data suggest a negative answer to the question whether
there are cross-cultural differences between Easterners and
Westerners w. r. t. reasoning about indicative conditionals,
counterfactuals, and their negations. Further experimental
work is needed to substantiate the hypothesis that conditional
probability is the universal key ingredient for psychological
theories of indicative conditionals and counterfactuals.
Finally, we note that adaptation of reasoning styles can be
one of the universal adaptive strategies across cultures. The
question of which aspects of human reasoning are universal,
and in how far they are universal, is important and calls for
collaborations of psychologists of reasoning and cultural psy-
chologists.
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